Developments in victims' rights in Ireland by Kilcommins, Shane et al.
Chapter 3: Developments in Victims Rights in Ireland 
Shane Kilcommins, Susan Leahy and Eimear Spain.  
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter documents some of the legislative and policy developments relating to 
victims’ rights in Ireland, Internationally, there has been growing recognition of the 
interests and needs of victims in the criminal justice system over the past few decades, 
where previous emphasis had been predominantly on the rights of the offender (Christie, 
1977; O’Hara, 2005). The result, in Ireland and in other jurisdictions, has been a series of  
developments which seek to enhance the support provided to victims, particularly in 
terms of their role as witnesses in court. 
 
3.2 Legal Developments  
 
The Irish courts and legislature are beginning to take more account of the interests of 
victims of crime and there has been an expansion in service (welfare) and procedural 
(participatory) rights. This ‘mainstreaming of victim-centred justice’ (Goodey, 2005: 35) 
in Ireland is evident in the introduction of a series of provisions designed to 
accommodate victims. To begin with, one can refer to the introduction of live television 
links in the courtroom. Ordinarily, the adversarial nature of the Irish criminal process 
requires that witnesses are examined viva voce in open court. In recognition, however, of 
the trauma that this may impose on victims of specified sexual or violent offences (LRC 
1989, 120-121) the legislature enacted section 13 of the Criminal Evidence Act 1992 
which provides that victims, among other witnesses, can give evidence in such cases via a 
live television link. In the case of victims of such offences who are under the age of 18
1
 
or are persons suffering from a ‘mental handicap’(s 19), there is a presumption in favour 
of giving evidence via television link (s. 13(1)(a)).. In all other cases, leave of the court is 
required (s. 13(1)(b). More recently, section 39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1999 provides 
that where a witness is in fear or subject to intimidation in any proceedings on indictment 
for an offence, that person may, with leave of the court, give evidence through a live 
                                                 
1
 The Criminal Evidence Act 1992 originally set this age at ‘under 17’, but this was amended by section 
257(3) of the Children Act 2001.  
television link. Section 29(1) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1992, as substituted by 
section 24 of the Extradition (European Union Conventions) Act 2001, attempts to 
accommodate witnesses who are outside the State from having to attend to give evidence 
at trial. It provides that in any criminal proceedings, a witness other than the accused 
may, with leave of the court, give evidence through a live television link.
2
 The use of 
such a provision was contested in the Irish courts in the cases of both Donnelly v Ireland 
[1998] 1 IR 321 and White v Ireland [1995] 1 IR 268 on the grounds that it constituted an 
unlawful interference with an accused person’s right to fairness of procedures. In neither 
case was the challenge successful.  
More recently, in D.O'D v Director of Public Prosecutions and Judge Patricia Ryan 
(Unreported, High Court, 17
th
 December, 2009), the applicant had been charged with 
having sexual relations with two mentally impaired persons. He sought leave to quash the 
order of the trial judge directing the use of video link facilities pursuant to section 
13(1)(b) of the Criminal Evidence Act of 1992. The applicant contended that the giving 
of evidence by video link by the two complainants would create a real risk that he would 
not get a fair trial because the giving of evidence by them by way of live video could or 
would convey to the jury that they were persons with mental impairment a matter which 
he disputed as part of his defence. The High Court upheld his claim, holding that 
evidence by video link in the circumstances carried with it a real risk of unfairness to the 
accused which probably could not be remedied by directions from the trial judge or 
statements from the prosecution. In the case, the prosecution applied for evidence to be 
given in this way under s. 13(1)(b) of the Act of 1992. Had the application been made 
under s. 13(1)(a) of the Act of 1992, it would have involved a finding that both of the 
complainants suffered from a ‘mental handicap’. The only material put before the trial 
judge which expressly considered the ability of either complainant to give evidence were 
the statements of psychologists.  
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 Since 2001, it also applies to extraditions proceedings and in particular to persons whose extradition is 
being sought. See also section 67 of the Criminal Justice (Mutual Assistance) Act 2008 which provides that 
a witness can give live television link evidence from another designated state.   
The defence objected on the grounds that it would create an inference that the 
complainants were vulnerable persons and persons who suffered from a mental 
impairment, if permitted to give evidence by way of video link. In essence, the defence 
argued that the issue of their mental impairment would be pre-determined and would 
impinge on his client's right to a fair trial. The trial judge directed that the evidence 
should be given by video link under 13(1)(b) of the CEA 1992. On appeal to the High 
Court, O’Neill J over turned this decision. He stated:  
In my judgment, it is clear that evidence by video link in the circumstances of this 
case does carry with it a real risk of unfairness to the accused person which 
probably cannot be remedied by directions from the trial judge or statements from 
the prosecution. Manifestly, s.13 of the Act of 1992 provides for the giving 
evidence by video link for offences such as the ones the applicant is charged with. 
The discretion which the Court has under s.13(1)(b) to order evidence to be given 
in this way or to direct otherwise raises the difficult question as to how the Court 
is to achieve a correct balance between the accused's right to a fair trial and the 
prosecution's right in an appropriate case to have evidence given by video link. It 
is clear that what is required is a test that achieves the correct balance between 
these two competing rights. 
 He went on to note: 
Where the Court reaches the conclusion that the giving of evidence in this way 
carries with it a serious risk of unfairness to the accused which could not be 
corrected by an appropriate statement from the prosecution or direction from the 
trial judge, it should only permit the giving of evidence by video link where it was 
satisfied by evidence that a serious injustice would be done, in the sense of a 
significant impairment to the prosecution’s case if evidence had to be given in the 
normal way, viva voce, thus necessitating evidence by video link in order to 
vindicate the right of the public to prosecute offences of this kind. The fact that 
the giving of evidence viva voce would be very unpleasant for the witness or 
coming to court to give evidence very inconvenient, would not be relevant factors.  
Having established the test, the judge went on to hold that  the trial judge did not achieve 
‘the correct balance in this case between the right of the applicant to a fair trial and the 
right of the first named respondent to prosecute the offences in question on behalf of the 
public’.  
Under section 14 (1) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1992, witnesses may, on application 
by the prosecution or the defence, also be permitted to give evidence in court through an 
intermediary in circumstances where they are using the live television link and are under 
18 years of age or are persons with a ‘mental handicap’ who have reached that age in 
relation to a sexual offence or an offence involving violence. The trial judge can grant 
such an application if he or she believes that the interests of justice require that any 
questions to be put to the witness be put through an intermediary. Questions put to a 
witness in this manner shall be either in the words used by the questioner or so as to 
convey to the witness in a way which is appropriate to his or her age and mental 
condition the meaning of the questions being asked. While evidence is being given 
through a live television link pursuant to section 13(1) of the Criminal Evidence Act 
1992, (except through an intermediary) neither the judge, nor the barrister or solicitor 
concerned in the examination of the witness, shall wear a wig or gown. Moreover if a 
child or a person with a mental disorder is giving evidence via a television link in respect 
of a victim impact statement, the same rule applies (s 5 Criminal Procedure Act 2010). 
 
Given the emphasis placed by our adversarial system on the orality of the proceedings, 
pre-trial statements are not generally permitted in the criminal process. The rationale 
underpinning the exclusion of such statements is that they constitute hearsay and 
ordinarily are excluded because they court is deprived of the normal methods of testing 
the credibility of the witness. A pre-trial statement for example is not given on oath; the 
demeanour of the witness making the statement cannot be observed by the trier of fact; 
and the defence has no opportunity to cross-examine the witness. The absence of this 
latter safeguard is of particular importance. More recently, however, it has been 
recognised that an overly rigid application of the hearsay rule can lead to injustice. 
Provision has accordingly been made for the admission of videorecordings, depositions 
and out of court statements in certain circumstances. Under section 16(1) of the 
Criminal Evidence Act 1992, for example, it provides that a videorecording of any 
evidence given by a person under 18 years of age or a person with a mental handicap 
through a live television link at the preliminary examination of a sexual offence or an 
offence involving violence shall be admissible at trial.  It also renders admissible at trial a 
videorecording of any statement made by a person under 14 years of age or a person with 
a mental handicap (being a person in respect of whom such a sexual offence or an offence 
involving violence is alleged to have been committed) during an interview with a 
member of the Garda Síochána or any other person who is competent for the purpose, 
provided the witness is available at trial for cross examination. This provision is, as 
Delahunt notes, ‘undoubtedly a practical step towards making the testimony of child 
witnesses and witnesses with an intellectual disability more easily heard within the 
criminal justice system’. (Delahunt 2011, 6). Section 4(b) of the Criminal Law (Human 
Trafficking) (Amendment) Act 2013 amended section 16(1)(b) and extended this 
provision to persons under the age of 18 (other than the accused) in relation to offences 
related to human trafficking,
3
 child trafficking and pornography
4
.  In these cases the 
videorecording shall not be admitted in evidence if the court is of opinion that it is not in 
the interests of justice to do so. In The People (DPP) v XY, for example,  the accused was 
charged with section 4 of the Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act 1990 after it was 
alleged that he forced a woman with an intellectual disability into performing the act of 
oral sex with him. In the case, the trial judge admitted as evidence a DVD recording of an 
interview with the complainant. This pre-trial recording was admitted as examination-in-
chief testimony. (LRC 2011, pp. 191-192; Delahunt 2010) 
 
 More general provision for the admission of depositions (and video recordings) at the 
pre-trial stage are now made under section 4G of the Criminal Procedure Act 1967, as 
amended. It provides that a deposition by a witness may be admitted in evidence at the 
trial of the accused if it is proved that— 
                                                 
3
 Committed under section 2, 4 or 7 of the Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) Act 2008 
4
 Committed under section 3(1), (2) or (3) of the Child Trafficking and Pornography Act 1998  
(a) the witness is dead, is unable to attend to give evidence at the trial, is prevented 
from so attending, or does not give evidence at the trial through fear or 
intimidation.  
(b) the accused was present at the taking of the evidence, and 
(c) an opportunity was given to crossexamine and re-examine the witness. 
The trial court retains a discretion to exclude such evidence if it is of the opinion that it is 
necessary in the interests of justice.  
 
Moreover, under section 255 of the Children Act 2001, a judge of the District Court, 
when satisfied on the evidence of a registered medical practitioner that the attendance 
before a court of any child would involve serious danger to the safety, health or wellbeing 
of the child, may take the evidence of the child concerned by way of sworn deposition or 
through a live television link in any case where the evidence is to be given through such a 
link. This relates to certain specified offences including cruelty against children, causing 
or procuring a child to engage in begging, allowing a child to be in a brothel, and causing 
or encouraging a sexual offence on a child, the murder or manslaughter of a child, any 
offence involving bodily injury to a child, and most sexual offences (Walsh 2005, 21).
5
  
 
Part 3 of the Criminal Justice Act, 2006 makes provision for the admission of a statement 
made by a witness in any criminal proceedings relating to an arrestable offence. It can be 
invoked either by the prosecution or the defence. It can occur in circumstances where the 
witness, although available for cross examination, refuses to give evidence, denies 
making the statement, or gives evidence which is materially consistent with it. The 
statement can then be admitted if it is proved that the witness made it, it is reliable, was 
made voluntarily, and direct oral evidence of the fact concerned would be admissible. 
The statement must be given on oath or affirmation or contain a declaration by the 
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 The rules set out in section 4F(3)of the Criminal Procedure Act 1967 apply to the taking of evidence 
under section 255 of the Children Act 2001. These rules provide as follows: a) when the evidence is being 
taken, both the accused and a judge of the District Court shall be present; (b) before it is taken, the judge 
shall inform the accused of the circumstances in which it may be admitted in evidence at the accused's trial; 
c) the witness may be cross-examined and re-examined; d) where the evidence is taken by way of sworn 
deposition, the deposition and any cross-examination and re-examination of the deponent shall be recorded, 
read to the deponent and signed by the deponent and the judge. 
witness that the statement is true to the best of his knowledge or belief, or, the court is 
otherwise satisfied that when the statement was made the witness understood the 
requirement to tell the truth. In determining whether the statement is reliable, the court 
will have regard to whether or not it was given on oath or affirmation or was 
videorecorded, if there is other evidence to support its reliability, and the explanations of 
the witness, if any, in refusing to give evidence. The court must also be satisfied that the 
admission of the statement would not be contrary to the interests of justice 
 
In some instances eye witness identification of the perpetrators of crime will be required 
at the pre-trial and trial stages of criminal process. This can be very traumatic for 
witnesses, particularly those who are the alleged victims. There are no one-way mirror 
identification systems in Garda stations, and very often the victim may find himself or 
herself in the same room as the accused. Moreover, at a pre-trial identification parade, the 
witness will according to the Garda Siochana Criminal Investigation Manual generally be 
asked to ‘place his/her hand on the identified person’s shoulder’ though fortunately it is 
now that case that this practice has been relaxed and the witness can, if he or she 
requests, make the identification by pointing and describing the person in question 
(Walsh 2002, para 6.55). Making an identification in court can also be difficult for a 
witness. More recently efforts have been made to alleviate this trauma. Persons giving 
evidence via television link under section 13 of CEA 1992 and section 39 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1999, as referred to above, shall not now be required to identify the accused at 
the trial of the offence if the accused is known to them (unless the court in the interests of 
justice directs otherwise). Moreover evidence by a person other than the witness that the 
witness identified the accused at an identification parade as being the offender shall be 
admissible as evidence that the accused was so indentified.  
 
The reduction of victim alienation has also occurred through the use of victim impact 
statements. Section 5 of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 made provision for the court to 
receive evidence or submissions concerning any effect of specified offences on the 
person in respect of whom an offence was committed. These offences relate to most 
sexual offences,  offences involving violence or the threat of violence to a person and 
female genital mutilation. Section 5 initially presupposed that the victims of these 
offences were capable themselves of giving evidence of the impact that the crime had on 
them (O’Malley 2009, 885). To combat the narrowness of this presumption, the Irish 
courts began as a practice to admit the evidence of family members of homicide victims 
(see DPP v O’Donoghue [2007] 2 IR 336). As a result of the introduction of section 4 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act 2010, a ‘person in respect of whom the offence was 
committed’ now includes a family member of that person when that person has died, is ill 
or is otherwise incapacitated as a result of the commission of the offence. A family 
member may also give evidence under section 5(3)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Justice Act 
1993, as amended, where the victim of the specified offence  suffers from a mental 
disorder (not related to the commission of the offence). Under section 5A of the Act, a 
child or a person with a mental disorder may give evidence of the impact of the crime 
through a live television link unless the court sees good reason to the contrary.
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Moreover, where a child or a person with a mental disorder is giving evidence through a 
live television link pursuant to section 5A, the court may, on the application of the 
prosecution or the accused, direct that any questions be put to the witness through an 
intermediary (provided it is in the interests of justice to do so) (s 5B Criminal Justice Act 
1993, as inserted by section of the Criminal Procedure Act 2010). 
 
The only purpose for which a victim impact statement can be received at sentencing stage 
is to describe the impact of the offence on the victim (or on the family members if the 
victim has died as a result of the offence). It cannot be used to adduce further evidence, to 
suggest the evidence that should be imposed, or to make fresh allegations. The 
prosecution bears the responsibility of ensuring that the statement restricts itself in this 
regard. The prosecution and defence may also examine the victim on any evidence given 
in respect of the impact of the crime (People (DPP) v C(M) (Unreported, Central 
Criminal Court, 16 June 1995).  
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 Provision is also made for any other witness, with leave of the court, to give victim impact evidence via a 
television link 
The Irish criminal process works off the assumption that all witnesses are competent to 
testify in court. If a dispute arises as to the competence of a particular witness, the party 
calling that witness bears the legal burden of proving that he or she is in fact competent. 
At common law, a witness demonstrates competence by showing that he or she 
understands the nature of an oath and is capable of giving an intelligent account.
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Testimony in civil and criminal proceedings normally requires that the evidence has to be 
given on oath or affirmation. As was noted in Mapp v Gilhooley [1991] IR 253, ‘the 
broad purpose of the rule is to ensure as far as possible that such viva voce evidence shall 
be true by the provision of a moral or religious and legal sanction against deliberate 
untruth’.  
 
Issues of competence primarily arise in respect of witnesses who are children or are 
persons with a mental disability. The law relating to both categories has become more 
accommodating in recent years. Traditionally, for example, a child could only give sworn 
evidence.
8
 Such evidence could only be given if, in addition to satisfying the 
intelligibility criterion, the child also could demonstrate that he or she understood ‘both 
the nature and consequences of an oath’ (R v Brasier (1779) 1 Leach 199). A more 
secular common law approach however began to emerge in the 1970s in relation to sworn 
evidence; the determining factor was ‘whether the child has a sufficient appreciation of 
the solemnity of the occasion and the added responsibility to tell the truth, which is 
involved in taking an oath, over and above the duty to tell the truth which is an ordinary 
duty of normal social conduct’ (R v Hayes [1977] 2 All ER 288). More recently, section 
27 of the Criminal Evidence Act 1992 was enacted which provides that in any criminal 
proceedings the evidence of a person under 14 years of age may be received otherwise 
than on oath or affirmation if the court is satisfied that he or she is capable of giving an 
intelligible account of events which are relevant to those proceedings.
9
 In a recent Court 
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 The determination as to whether a child understands the nature and consequences of an oath is one for the 
trial judge. See AG v. O’Sullivan [1930] IR 553. 
8
 If a child was capable of giving an intelligible account, but did not understand the importance of telling 
the truth under oath, it was still possible for him or her to give unsworn testimony under section 30 of the 
1908 Children’s Act, as amended by section 28(2) of Criminal Justice Act of 1914. Such testimony 
however needed to be corroborated. 
9
 See also section 255 of the Children Act 2001 which provides that the evidence of a child under 14 years 
of Appeal decision in People (DPP) v P.P. [2015] IECA 152, Sheehan J. held that while it 
is preferable that an inquiry be made into the capacity of the person under 14 to give an 
intelligible account of relevant proceedings prior to placing the evidence before the jury, 
a failure to carry out a formal inquiry in advance does not render a trial unsatisfactory. 
The court in this case was influenced by the fact that the absence of a formal inquiry did 
not result in unfairness to the appellant and that it was clear from cross examination that 
the child was not only capable of giving an intelligible account but did in fact provide 
one. Significantly, and as we shall see later, section 28(1) abolishes the mandatory 
requirement that the unsworn evidence of a child be corroborated; a trial judge now has a 
discretion whether a jury should be given a warning about the dangers of convicting on 
the unsworn evidence of a child. 
 
Persons suffering from a mental impairment were traditionally excluded from giving 
evidence at trial. The common law, however, then altered, and permitted such a witness 
to testify provided he or she was capable of understanding the nature and consequences 
of an oath, was capable of giving an intelligible account, and the mental disorder did not 
impede his or her ability to give evidence at trial (R v Hill (1851) 2 Den 254). If a witness 
has communicative difficulties, an interpreter may be provided to aid with the giving of 
evidence. In People (DPP) v Gillane (Unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, 14 
December, 1998), for example, it was held that it was permissible for a witness to give 
identification evidence for the prosecution in a case despite the fact that he believed that 
staff at the Mater Hospital had inserted a microchip into his head. As the court noted, 
though the witness ‘had very strange ideas about what was done to him when he had an 
operation on his head some twenty years before in the Mater Hospital, [this] does not 
mean that he was incapable of giving evidence’.   
 
If, however, a mentally impaired person was not able or permitted to give sworn 
evidence, there was no means by which unsworn evidence could be given. In DPP v JS 
(Unreported, Circuit Court, 1983), for example, a moderately mentally impaired 
                                                                                                                                                 
of age may be taken or received otherwise than on oath or affirmation if the court is satisfied that the child 
is capable of giving an intelligible account of events which are relevant to those proceedings. It relates to 
certain specified offences mentioned in part 12 and schedule 1 of the Act.  
complainant could not answer questions as to the nature of the oath or the nature of a lie 
at trial. She made no response when asked by the judge what the moral and legal 
consequences of telling a lie were. In the result, she could not be sworn and, as there was 
no independent evidence in the case, a nolle prosequi was entered (LRC 1990, 10). 
Similarly, DPP v MW (Unreported, Circuit Court, 1983) a moderately impaired 
complainant alleged that she was raped in a car. The accused was charged with two 
counts, rape and unlawful carnal knowledge of a mentally impaired person. At the rape 
trial, the trial judge ruled that she was competent to take the oath. Her testimony at trial, 
however, was held to be contradictory and the judge directed an acquittal. Subsequently 
the accused was tried with the second count, unlawful carnal knowledge of a mentally 
impaired person. On this occasion, however, her preliminary answers on questions 
pertaining to the nature of an oath were less satisfactory, and the trial judge declined to 
have her sworn. As there was no independent evidence in the case, the prosecution was 
compelled to enter a nolle prosequi. (LRC 1990, 10)  
 
Fortunately section 27(3) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1992 now provides that the 
evidence of a person with a ‘mental handicap’ may be received otherwise than on oath or 
affirmation if the court is satisfied that the person is capable of giving an intelligible 
account of events which are relevant to the proceedings. In O’Sullivan v Hamill [1999] 3 
IR 9, O’Higgins CJ noted  
Unsworn evidence is provided for from a person with a mental handicap ‘if the court 
is satisfied that he is capable of giving an intelligible account of events which are 
relevant to those proceedings’. In my view, before that section comes into play there 
are two requirements on which the court has to be satisfied - (1) that the person has a 
mental handicap, and (2) that he is capable of giving an intelligible account of events 
which are relevant to the proceedings. Clearly there must be an inquiry. 
Determining the answers to these questions in that inquiry at trial may require expert 
medical opinion evidence. A corroborative warning may need to be given to the jury in 
respect of the testimony of a witness suffering from a mental disability (People (DPP) v 
Molloy Unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, July 28, 1995).  
 Determining the capacity of a witness to give an intelligible account has can rise to 
difficulties. In the recent Laura Kelly case, the complainant, who has Downs Syndrome, 
alleged that she was sexually assaulted at a 21
st
 birthday party. The family claimed that 
shortly after Ms Kelly was put to bed, a family member entered the bedroom and saw a 
man in bed with her. It was alleged that Ms Kelly had most of her clothes removed and 
the man was naked from the waist down. However, at trial, Ms Kelly, who had ‘a mental 
age of four’, was deemed incompetent to testify and the case was dismissed. Ms Kelly’s 
mother stated: 
 
She [Laura] was brought into this room in the Central Criminal Court and asked 
questions about numbers and colours and days of the week which had no 
relevance in Laura’s mind. She knew that she had to go into a courtroom and tell 
a story so the bad man would be taken away. "It was ridiculous. There is no one 
trained in Ireland to deal with someone similar to Laura, from the gardaí up to the 
top judge in Ireland and the barristers and solicitors. (Irish Examiner, 30 March, 
2010) 
  
Traditionally, too, the spouse of an accused was not competent to give evidence for the 
prosecution in a case, except in the case of rape or violence perpetrated on that spouse (R 
v. Lapworth [1931] 1 KB 117).
10
 This was justified on the basis of marital unity (the law 
made no distinction between the accused and the spouse) and the importance of 
preserving marital harmony. The constitutionality of this rule was challenged in People 
DPP v JT (1998) 3 Frewen 141. The complainant was a 20 year old woman who had 
Downs Syndrome who alleged that she had been sexually abused by her father. At trial 
the spouse of the accused and the complainant’s mother gave evidence that at the end of a 
television programme concerning child sexual abuse, her daughter expressed delight that 
the wrongdoer in the programme was eventually brought to justice. As a result of 
questioning her daughter on the issue, it emerged that the complainant’s father had 
allegedly perpetrated similar abuses as those illustrated on the programme. The accused 
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 There were also some other specific statutory exceptions.  
was convicted but appealed on the basis, inter alia, that his spouse was incompetent to 
testify for the prosecution. In upholding the conviction, Walsh J examined the common 
law rule and declared that its application on the facts of the cases would be in violation of 
Article 41 of the Constitution which protected family rights.  
 
Section 21 of the Criminal Evidence Act 1992, as amended by section 257(3) of the 
Children Act 2001 now provides that in any criminal proceedings a spouse of the accused 
is competent to give evidence for the prosecution. Such a spouse, however, is only 
compellable to give evidence at the instance of the prosecution in the case of an offence 
which involves violence or the threat of violence to the spouse, a child of the spouse or of 
the accused, or any person who was at the material time under the age of 18 years, or is a 
sexual offence alleged to have been committed in relation to a child of the spouse or the 
accused, or any person who was at the material time under the age of 18 years (Jackson 
1993 202). More extensive compellability requirements for the prosecution exist for 
former spouses under section 22(2) of the same Act.   
 
In more recent years the system has also witnessed a greater awareness of the reasons 
why a complainant may not have made a complaint of a sexual offence at first reasonable 
opportunity but still avail of the doctrine of recent complaint
11
 (see, for example, 
People (DPP) v DR [1998] 2 IR 106); a relaxation of the exclusionary rule on opinion 
evidence in certain circumstances;
12
 the introduction of a provision which makes it clear 
that the absence of resistance by a victim in a rape case does not equate with consent 
(section 9 of the Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act 1990); tighter restrictions that 
offer victims better protection against unnecessary and distressing information being 
raised about their sexual histories;
13
 separate legal representation for sexual offence 
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 In a case involving a sexual offence, a voluntary complaint made at the first reasonable opportunity after 
the commission of the alleged offence is admissible to demonstrate consistency and credibility on the part 
of the complainant.  
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 Section 3(4)(b) of the Domestic Violence Act 1996, for example, permits an applicant for a barring order 
to provide opinion evidence that he or she has a legal or beneficial interest in the place of residence that is 
not less than that of the respondent.  
13
 Section 3 of the Criminal Law (Rape) Act 1981, as amended by section 13 of the Criminal Law (Rape) 
(Amendment) Act 1990 now provides that, except with leave of the court, no questions shall be asked in 
cross examination about the sexual experience of a complainant. Previously in a rape case where the 
defence was one of consent, the trial judge was obliged ‘to allow unpleasant charges to be made against the 
complainants where an application is made to admit previous sexual history (section 34, 
Sex Offenders Act, 2001); greater protection of the identity of victims
14
 and witnesses
15
 
in criminal cases; the introduction of measures to restrict unjustified imputations at 
trial against the character of a deceased or incapacitated victim or witness (s. 33 
Criminal Procedure Act 2010); the introduction of an exception to the rule against 
double jeopardy when new and compelling evidence becomes available (Part 3, 
Criminal Procedure Act 2010); the introduction of bail conditions requiring a bail 
applicant to refrain from going to specific locations or to meet specified persons;  the 
creation of a statutory offence of intimidation of witnesses or their families (s 41 of 
Criminal Justice Act 1999); the ability of the DPP to appeal unduly lenient sentences (s 
2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1993, as amended by section 23 of the Criminal Justice Act 
2006); and provisions for the payment of compensation to victims through a non-
statutory scheme introduced in 1974, and a statutory scheme introduced under section 6 
of the Criminal Justice Act 1993.  Kilcommins et al., 2004: 150-153; Rogan, 2006a: 202-
208; Fennell 2010:250-260; Vaughan and Kilcommins 2010) 
 
Over the years the common law also devised particular corroboration rules in respect of 
certain categories of ‘suspect’ witnesses such as sexual complainants, children, 
accomplices and so on. Ordinarily, an accused person in a criminal trial can be convicted 
on the testimony of one witness alone. However, for suspect witnesses such as those cited 
above, a warning of the dangers of convicting on such evidence in the absence of 
corroboration had had to be given to the jury.  The previously fossilised exclusionary 
assumptions underpinning the perception of some victims/witnesses in the Irish criminal 
justice system is evident, for example, in the law on the corroboration of sexual 
complaints. In the past the evidence of a complainant in a sexual offences case required a 
mandatory warning to the jury on the dangers of acting on such evidence alone. This rule 
was justified ‘by the fear that complaints of sexual offences may sometimes be the 
product of spite, jealousy, psychological denial of having consented, or a reaction to 
                                                                                                                                                 
complainant in connection with her past; he should not indicate to the jury that he disapproves of this being 
done’. People (DPP) v McGuinness [1978] IR 189 
14
 See, for example, section 7 of the Criminal Law (Rape) Act 1991, as amended; section 11 of the Criminal 
Law (Human Trafficking) Act 2008; and section 252 of the Children Act 2001. 
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 See section 181 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006. 
having been jolted; that women with nothing to lose might seek to subject a man of high 
social standing to blackmail; and that the accusation of rape is easily made, but difficult 
to defend’ (Healy, 2004: 157). More recently, however, these essentialised notions about 
the traits and motives of sexual complainants have largely been abandoned and the trial 
judge now has discretion whether or not to give such a warning to the jury (s 7 Criminal 
Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act 1990). 
 
In respect of the unsworn testimony of child witnesses, corroboration by some other 
material evidence was also required to obtain a conviction against an accused party. This 
could not be the unsworn evidence of another child. In Attorney General (Kelly) v Kearns 
(1946) 80 ILTR 45, for example, the defendant was charged with attempted carnal 
knowledge of a girl aged 9 (RB), indecent assault of the same girl, and indecent assault of 
two other girls also aged 9 (AH and MC respectively). Two of the girls gave evidence 
that they were in the defendant’s house together and that each saw the unpleasant acts 
being perpetrated against the other (RB and AH). The other girl (MC) gave evidence that 
on a different date she was also in the defendant’s house and that he also indecently 
assaulter her. Playmates of the three complainants also gave unsworn testimony that the 
three complainants went into the defendant’s house.  
Molony J held: 
Corroboration is a statutory requirement in the case of the unsworn 
testimony of a child of tender years. Sec. 30 of the Children Act, 1908 , 
has the proviso “(a) A person shall not be liable to be convicted of the 
offence unless the testimony admitted by virtue of this section and given 
on behalf of the prosecution is corroborated by some other material 
evidence in support thereof implicating the accused.” …[I]t is quite clear 
from the vast number of authorities that, to quote from the headnote in 
Rex. v. Coyle [1926] N. I. 208 , ‘the unsworn testimony of a child of 
tender years admitted by virtue of section 30 of the Children Act, 1908 , 
could not be corroborated within the meaning of proviso (a) to that 
section, by the unsworn testimony, similarly admitted, of any number of 
such children.’…It will be remembered that the children R. B. and A. H. 
both said they were together in [the defendant’s] room, and each witnessed 
the assault upon the other. I am clear that R. B.’s story does not, in law, 
corroborate A. H.’s story, nor does A. H.’s story corroborate R. B.’s 
story—nor do any of the little girls, other than those alleged to be injured 
afford corroboration—simply because, in my opinion, they are incapable 
of giving corroboration. The same remarks apply in respect to the charge 
in connection with M. C.  
Since there was no other evidence in the case, the prosecution failed, demonstrating the 
harshness of the rules on corroboration. For the sworn evidence of children, a mandatory 
warning had to be given of the dangers of convicting on such evidence in the absence of 
corroboration. More recently, the legislature has moved away from the operating 
assumption that the evidence of children was inherently flawed or unreliable. Section 
28(1) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1992 abolished the requirement that the unsworn 
evidence of children had to be corroborated and s 28 (2)(a) abolished the mandatory 
warning about the dangers of convicting on the sworn evidence of children in the absence 
of corroboration. Section 28(3) of the same Act also provides that the unsworn evidence 
of a child may corroborate unsworn evidence given by any other person,
16
 ensuring that 
the decision in Kearns will not reoccur. 
In respect of witnesses with a mental disability, there is no statutory law requiring 
corroboration or that a corroboration warning be given. However, there is some case law 
support for the view that in the case of such witnesses, a warning should be given of the 
dangers of convicting on the testimony of such witnesses in the absence of corroborative 
evidence (see, for example, the Australian case of Bromley v R (1986) 161 CLR 315). In 
Ireland, in The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v. M.J.M  .(Unreported, Court of 
Criminal Appeal, 28th July, 1995), in a sexual offence cases, a trial judge invoked his 
discretion to give a warning under section 7 of the Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) 
Act 1990 in a sexual offences cases in part based on the  mental status of the 
complainant, and in particular  the fact that she had a childlike mind. It should be noted 
however that the Law Reform Commission in Ireland suggested in 1990 that there should 
be no corroboration requirement in respect of persons suffering from a mental disability 
(1990, p. 24).    
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It is also open to a victim of crime to take a civil action against the perpetrator. In M.N. 
v. S.M. [2005] 4 I.R. 461 at 472, for example, the court considered the appropriate level 
of damages to order in civil proceedings for a continuum of sexual abuse over five years 
which culminated in the rape of a teenager. The law is also constantly evolving in this 
field. The Statute of Limitations Act 1957 was amended in 2000, for example,  to take 
account of acts of sexual abuse which may result in tort actions, and in particular the 
capacity of some victims of this abuse to bring actions within the relevant time period. 
The courts too are developing jurisprudence on civil wrongs. In a recent case of Walsh v 
Byrne [2015] IEHC 414, the plaintiff took an action for personal injuries, loss, damage, 
inconvenience and expense including aggravated damages for sexual assault and battery 
and trespass to the person. He also  sought a declaration that the entire relationship 
created by the defendant with the plaintiff constituted a continuum of oppression, and 
argued that the court should develop the law by recognising the practice of grooming for 
the purposes of sexual abuse as either a new tort or the development of existing tort law. 
White J accepted this reasoning and recognised  the ‘continuum of sexual abuse’ as a 
new tort:  
 
[T]he mental trauma suffered by the plaintiff, is not just confined to the acts of 
assault and battery, but arises also as a result of the consequences of the breach of 
trust of the defendant who had played such an important role in the plaintiff’s life. 
The court’s objective consideration of the purpose of the defendant’s kindness, 
concern and considerable investment of time, to the period when the abuse 
stopped was for the insidious purpose of satisfying his own sexual desire. For 
those reasons, it is appropriate to extend the law of tort, to cover what is now a 
well recognised and established pattern of wrongdoing, where a child is 
befriended, where trust is established and where that friendship and trust is used 
to perpetrate sexual abuse. 
 
2.3 Policy Developments 
 
In Ireland, the Victim’s Charter marked an important policy development for crime 
victims (McGovern 2002, 393; Rogan 2006, 153).  This Charter was produced by the 
Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform in September 1999, reflecting the 
‘commitment to giving victims of crime a central place in the criminal justice. As such it 
amalgamates for the first time ‘all the elements of the criminal justice system from the 
victim’s perspective’ (1999: 3). In 2005, a review of the entire Charter was undertaken by 
the Commission for the Support of Victims of Crime. A revised Victim’s Charter and 
Guide to the Criminal Justice System was produced in 2010 and attempts to increase the 
information available to victims of crime from the Crime Victims Helpline, the Garda 
Siochana, the Courts Service, the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Prison Service, the 
Probation Service, the Legal Aid Board, the Coroner’s Service and the Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Tribunal. It sets out the entitlements a victim has from these various 
services, but it does not confer legal rights.  
The needs of crime victims in Ireland are also addressed by a wide variety of victims’ 
organisations. These operate both at the national and local level. In Ireland, these groups 
include, inter alia, Advic, Amen, The Commission for the Support of Court Support 
Services, National Crime Victims’ Helpline, Rape Crisis Centres, Support after 
Homicide, Irish Centre for Parentally Abducted Children, Irish Tourist Assistance 
Service, One in Four, Sexual Violence Centre Cork, Survivors of Child Abuse and so on. 
Whilst a significant proportion are specialised in nature dealing with specific types of 
victim or services, there are also some key national groups. Similarly, Victim Support at 
Court provides support to itnesses and victims both before and during court proceedings, 
including pre-trial visits and court accompaniment during proceedings. The Victims’ 
Rights Alliance, which was launched in November 2013, is an amalgam of victims’ 
support and human rights organisations with the purpose of ensuring that the new 
Victims’ Rights Directive is implemented within the proposed time frame (by November 
2015). SAFE Ireland is an organisation established to raise awareness about the 
prevalence of domestic violence and to advocate on behalf of its victims. Other 
associations and groups include the Irish Road Victims Association (established in 2012) 
and the PARC road safety group (established in 2006), which offer support to road traffic 
victims and their families. 
For example, the national Crime Victims Helpline, which represents a proactive initiative 
to support crime victims, was launched in 2005. It is funded by the Commission for the 
Support of Victims of Crime and offers support to victims of crime in Ireland. Similarly 
the Court Support Service provides support to witnesses and victims both before and 
during court proceedings, including pre-trial visits and court accompaniment during 
proceedings. It has stated in its strategic plan for 2011-2014 that it hopes to promote its 
service among groups who may be ‘isolated, vulnerable and/or disadvantaged’ and 
includes people with disabilities within this cohort.  
Furthermore, as far back as 1974, a Criminal Injuries Compensation Tribunal was 
established by the then Government to administer a scheme designed to alleviate some of 
the financial difficulties experienced by victims of violent crime and their families. The 
purpose of this scheme was to compensate individuals for losses arising from personal 
injuries as a result of violent crime or acquired while assisting another individual in 
preventing a crime or saving a human life. Individuals eligible to apply for compensation 
under this scheme include the injured person(s), the immediate family of the injured 
person(s) if the victim has died as a result of the crime, or those responsible for looking 
after the injured party. 
 
The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions has also been active in respect of 
victims needs and concerns. It has, for example, published a number of documents which 
have implications for victims’ experiences of criminal justice organisations: The Role of 
the D.P.P; Attending Court as a Witness; Statement of General Guidelines for 
Prosecutors; and, Prosecution Policy on the Giving of Reasons for Decisions. A Reasons 
for Decisions pilot project also commenced in Ireland in October 2008. Ordinarily the 
DPP is under no obligation to give reasons in respect of a decision not to prosecute, as 
established in cases such as The State (McCormack) v Curran [1987] ILRM 225 and 
Eviston v DPP (Unreported, 31 July, 2002). The project, however, reverses this rule as it 
relates to homicide offences such as murder, manslaughter, infanticide, fatalities in the 
workplace, and vehicular manslaughter. In such cases reasons for decisions not to 
prosecute, or to discontinue a prosecution, were given by the Office of the Director of 
Public Prosecutions on request to parties closely connected with the deceased, such as 
members of the deceased’s family or household, their legal or medical advisers, or social 
workers acting on their behalf. Such reasons however would only be given where it was 
possible to do so without creating an injustice.  
The Courts Service has also issued a number of publications including Going to Court 
and  Explaining the Courts. The Committee for Judicial Studies also recently published a 
guide for the Irish judiciary, entitled The Equal Treatment of Persons in Court: guidance 
for the judiciary (2011). Measures that have been taken to improve access to the courts 
include the use of induction loops for persons with a hearing impairment in the 
courtrooms of refurbished buildings; signage and contact details for court offices are in 
Braille; wheelchair ramps are provided in many courthouses; and wheelchair users can 
give evidence in many courthouses at the front of the court beside the witness box. The 
Gardaí have also given a number of commitments to victims of crime including an 
assurance regarding the provision of information on the progress of a case and on the 
prosecution process, as set out in its Charter for Victims of Crime. The Garda Victim 
Liaison Office, for example, is responsible for developing Garda Policy on victims of 
crime, and for ensuring the implementation of the Garda aspect of the Victims’ Charter. 
Garda Family Liaison Officers have been introduced to provide support to victims of 
crime affected by traumatic crimes such as homicide, kidnap, false imprisonment, 
hostage siege situations and other serious crimes where this is deemed appropriate by the 
local Superintendent. The role of the Family Liaison Officer is to keep the victim 
informed on all matters relating to the crime and to provide practical information and 
support. Referrals can be made by the Garda Family Liaison Office, with the consent of 
the victim, to ensure appropriate emotional and psychological support. Garda Ethnic 
Liaison Officers are trained to provide specific support and advice to victims of racist 
incidents and the Gardaí also provide a Liaison scheme for the LGBT Community.  
Officers are trained to provide support to victims from this community and encourage 
reporting of homophobic crime where appropriate.  
Along with these policy developments in Ireland, a number of administrative moves ― 
as part of a Justice for Victims Initiative ―  to increase the level of support to victims of 
crime have also been implemented. For example, a new executive office has been 
established in the Department of Justice to support crime victims (established September, 
2008). The core mandate of this Victims of Crime Office is to improve the continuity and 
quality of services to victims of crime, by state agencies and non-governmental 
organisations throughout the country. It works to support the development of competent, 
caring and efficient services to victims of crime. A reconstituted Commission for the 
Support of Victims of Crime occurred in September, 2008. Working with an annual 
budget from the Department of Justice and Equality, the Commission provides funding 
for services and supports to victims of crime. The Commission also works to improve 
cohesion and consistency of service and information available to victims of crime. A 
Victims of Crime Consultative Forum held its first meeting in January 2009. It provides a 
forum for victim support organisations to put forward the views of victims with a view to 
shaping strategy and policy initiatives.  
A Victims’ Rights Bill was initiated in 2008 the purpose of which was to make provision 
for the treatment of and rights of victims of criminal offences. More recently, the first 
commitment in the Justice and Law Reform section of the Programme for Government, 
2011-2016 indicated a requirement for legislation to strengthen the rights of victims of 
crime and their families, including greater use of victim impact statements and  statutory 
rights to information.  
Two new Bills have recently been introduced. The General Scheme of the Criminal 
Justice (Victims of Crime) Bill 2015 was introduced in July 2015 as part of the process 
of implementing the Victims’ Rights Directive, a task which must be completed by 16th 
November 2015. The Bill provides some important new measures to strengthen victims’ 
rights. One of the significant developments in this proposed legislation is the increased 
level of information which will be provided to victims. The Bill provides that an 
individual contacting the Gardaí to inform them that s/he has been the victim of a 
criminal offence must be provided with certain information. For example, s/he should be 
informed about: procedures for making a complaint alleging an offence; services which 
provide support for victims of crime; the role of the victim in the criminal justice process; 
available protection measures; legal aid and entitlement to interpretation and/or 
translation assistance.  Victims are also entitled to request certain additional information 
about their cases and Gardaí are obliged to provide that information ‘as soon as is 
practicable’.  For example, under this provision, a victim can request information about 
significant developments in the investigation of the offence or information relating to the 
trial of an alleged offender. Other significant developments in the Bill include the 
requirement that the Gardaí or the DPP to provide victims with reasons for decisions not 
to prosecute a crime  and the introduction of a process for formally reviewing a decision 
not to prosecute.   
A notable feature of the Bill is the introduction of ‘victim personal statements’ which 
apply to offences other than those where a victim impact statement may be given.   A 
‘victim personal statement’ should ‘set out how the victim has been affected by the 
offence including, as the case may be, physically, emotionally, financially or in any other 
way but shall not include any prejudicial comment on the offender or comment on the 
appropriate sentence be imposed on the offender’.  This statement is provided to the 
Gardaí who will forward it to the DPP, as appropriate.  These statements are submitted by 
the prosecutor to the trial court and served on the defence prior to sentencing  and must 
be taken into account when determining the sentence to be imposed.  Further protections 
for victims during investigation  and whilst testifying are provided for in Parts 5 of the 
Bill. For example, on the application of the prosecution, special measures such as the 
testifying via video-link or from behind a screen may be made available to a victim 
where the court is satisfied that this is necessary to protect him/her.  This is a significant 
extension of the availability of the special measures which are available in the Criminal 
Evidence Act 1992, which were previously only available to victims of a limited number 
of offences.  
The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Bill 2015 increases protection for victims of 
sexual offences in a number of significant ways. Perhaps most notably, the Bill 
introduces a procedure for regulating the disclosure of counselling records in sexual 
offence trials. Previously, under Irish law there was no procedure for regulation 
disclosure of counselling records which were held by third parties such as counsellors or 
social workers.  Section 33 of the Bill  fills this lacuna, creating formal application 
process for the introduction of this evidence which is similar to the process which 
regulates the disclosure of sexual experience evidence. If the defence seeks disclosure of 
counselling records, a written application to court must be made.  A hearing will then 
take place to determine whether disclosure should be ordered.  The complainant (who is 
entitled to legal representation ) and the record-holder are entitled to be heard at this 
hearing  and the judge must provide reasons for his/her decision regarding disclosure.  
The section provides useful guidelines to structure judicial discretion in deciding whether 
to order disclosure.  These guidelines, along with the possibility of imposing conditions 
upon disclosure orders , are designed to ensure that disclosure of records goes no further 
than is necessary, maximising protection of victims’ privacy rights. 
The Bill also amends the special measures for testifying provided for in the Criminal 
Evidence Act 1992. Importantly, the definition of ‘sexual offence’ in section 2 of the 
1992 Act is extended to ensure that the special measures contained therein are available 
for the new offences created by the 2015 Bill.  The Bill repeals section 13 of the 1992 
Act which provides that wigs and gowns should not be worn by judges or legal 
professionals where a child is giving evidence via video-link.  Instead, judges and legal 
professionals concerned in the examination of witnesses are prohibited from wearing 
wigs and gowns in all circumstances where evidence is given by a child under eighteen 
years in a sexual offence case to which the 1992 Act applies.  The Bill introduces the 
possibility for those under the age of eighteen to give evidence from behind a screen to 
prevent the witness from seeing the defendant.  Defendants are also prohibited from 
personally cross-examining witnesses who are under fourteen years of age.  
Unfortunately, this provision has not been extended to adult complainants. The 2015 Bill 
amends section 16 of the 1992 Act, increasing the age limit for out-of-court video-
recording of complainants’ evidence from fourteen to eighteen years of age.  A final 
important development in the 2015 Bill is the introduction of harassment orders which 
may be imposed upon convicted sex offenders when passing sentence or at any time 
before their release from prison. Such orders may prohibit the respondent from 
communicating with the victim and order the respondent to stay within a specified 
distance of the victim’s home, workplace or any other place frequented by the victim.  
Harassment orders shall cease to have effect on the date of the respondent’s release from 
prison or an earlier date specified by the court or the court may impose the order for a 
period of up to twelve months from the date of the respondent’s release.  Contravention 
of a harassment order is an offence.   
2.4. EU/ECHR Developments 
A number of key developments in Europe have also promoted recognition of the needs of 
victims within criminal justice systems. Internationally, the General Assembly of the 
United Nations adopted the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of 
Crime and Abuse of Power in 1985. Recognising ‘that the victims of crime and the 
victims of abuse of power, and also frequently their families, witnesses and others who 
aid them, are unjustly subjected to loss, damage or injury and that they may, in addition, 
suffer hardship when assisting in the prosecution of offenders’, the Declaration set forth a 
number of rights which included: the right to be treated with respect and recognition; the 
right to be referred to adequate support services; the right to receive information about 
the progress of the case;  the right to be present and give input to the decision-making; 
the right to counsel; the right to protection of physical safety and privacy; and the right of 
compensation, from both the offender and the State. The document is not legally binding 
but does set out the minimum standards for the treatment of victims of crime. Among 
other things, it recommends that police and the judiciary should be provided with proper 
training, with special emphasis given to those with special needs (Article 17).  It has been 
described as providing “a benchmark for victim-friendly legislation and policies.” (Van 
Dijk 2005: 202).  
The Council of Europe also recognised that it ‘is essential to put victims and witnesses at 
the very heart of the justice system. Victims should and need to be treated with the 
respect and dignity they deserve when coming into contact with justice, in particular so 
that they are safe from secondary victiminsation’17 Recommendation (2006)8, for 
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example, provides that  ‘States should ensure the effective recognition of, and respect for, 
the rights of victims with regard to their human rights; they should, in particular, respect 
the security, dignity, private and family life of victims and recognise the negative effects 
of crime on victims’ (Article 2.1). Article 3.4, in particular, points out that ‘States should 
ensure that victims who are particularly vulnerable, either through their personal 
characteristics or through the circumstances of the crime, can benefit from special 
measures best suited to their situation’.18 
The European Union has also more recently began to focus on the area of criminal justice 
area, particularly following the introduction of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, which 
among other things promoted greater judicial cooperation in criminal matters. 
Cooperation was intensified after the Tampere summit in Finland in 1999, the first 
European Council meeting explicitly dedicated to justice and home affairs.  In 1999, the 
European Commission adopted a communication entitled Crime Victims in the European 
Union – standards and actions. In March 2001, the Council adopted a Framework 
Decision on the Standing of Victims in Criminal Proceedings, which provides for 
minimum rights (including the right  to be heard and furnish evidence, access to relevant 
information, the opportunity to participate, and the right to compensation) to be ensured 
in all the territories of the EU. This was replaced in 2012 with an important directive on 
victims’ rights, Directive 2012/29/EU establishing minimum standards on the rights, 
support and protection of victims of crime (the Victims Directive). Under the Victims 
Directive, victims should be “recognised and treated in a respectful, sensitive, tailored, 
professional and non-discriminatory manner, in all contacts with victim support or 
restorative justice services or competent authorities operating within the context of 
criminal proceedings.”19 The Directive builds on existing rights for victims and contains 
more tangible and comprehensive rights for victims than existed previously. The 
Directive also places clearer obligations on Member States including an obligation to 
conduct individual assessments of victims to identify vulnerability and special protection 
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 Article 1 
measures.
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 Communication with victims must now also be accessible, with an emphasis 
on child sensitive communication.
21
 Interestingly, family members of deceased victims 
are now defined as victims and bestowed with all the rights afforded to victims in the 
directive.
22
 Other rights include a right to access victim support services under Article 8, 
a right to be heard under Article 10 and a right to be informed about a decision not to 
prosecute the offender and a right to have such decision reviewed under Article 11. The 
Directive forms part of a package of measures including measures aimed at victims of 
specific crimes including the Directive on Trafficking in Human Beings
23
 and the 
Directive on Child Sexual Exploitation
24
. 
The European Commission also issued a proposal for a Council Directive on 
Compensation to Crime Victims to reduce the disparities in the compensation schemes of 
various member States. The Council adopted this Directive on the 29
th
 of April, 2004. 
The Directive ensures that compensation is easily accessible in practice regardless of 
where in the EU a person becomes the victim of a crime. Similarly the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted Recommendation Rec (2006)8 on assistance 
to victims of crime on the 14th June, 2006. It sets out various provisions and recommends 
that member states be guided by them in their domestic legislation.  These provisions 
relate to the role of public services and victim support services, the provision of 
information to victims, the right to effective access to other remedies, state compensation, 
insurance, protection of physical and psychological integrity, confidentiality, and 
training. There are also other pieces of EU law facilitating the provision of compensation 
to crime victims from the offender. The Regulation on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of 
Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters, for example, provides that the victim may 
sue the offender for damages in the same court that deals with the criminal proceedings, 
if this is possible under national law. The same Regulation also lays down how a crime 
victim can enforce a judgment for damages against the offender in another member State. 
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The Victims Directive also establishes a right to a decision on compensation from the 
offender in the course of criminal proceedings under Article 16. 
The European Convention on Human Rights, which Ireland incorporated at a sub-
constitutional level in 2003, has also been interpreted in ways that began to afford rights 
to victims of crime. Though the Convention does not explicitly refer to victims of crime, 
the jurisprudence of the Court has placed obligations on member states to criminalise 
wrongdoing, ‘to take preventive operational measures’, to investigate and give reasons, 
and to adequately protect victims and witnesses at various stages in the criminal process. 
These obligations arise under Articles 2 (right to life), 3 (degrading treatment), 6 (fair 
trial) and 8 (private life) and have been analysed in cases such as Osman v The United 
Kingdom [1998] EHRLR 228, X and Y v The Netherlands [1985] 8 EHRR 2350, MC v 
Bulgaria [2003] ECHR 3927/98), A v UK [1999] 27 EHRR 611, and KU v Finland 
[2008] 48 EHRR 1237. In 1996, for example, the court in Doorson v The Netherlands 
[1996] 22 EHRR 330 expanded its interpretation of Article 6, primarily concerned with 
the rights of defendants in criminal proceedings, to take account of the rights of 
vulnerable witnesses and defendants. It noted:  
 
It is true that Article 6 does not explicitly require the interests of witnesses in general, and 
those of victims called upon to testify in particular, to be taken into consideration. 
However their life, liberty or security of person may be at stake, as may interests coming 
generally with in the ambit of Article 8 [right to a private life]. Such interests of 
witnesses and victims are in principle protected by other, substantive provisions of the 
Convention, which imply that Contracting States should organise their criminal 
proceedings in such a way that those interests are not unjustifiably imperilled. Against 
this background, principles of fair trial also require that in appropriate cases the interests 
of the defence are balanced against those of witnesses or victims called upon to testify 
(our emphasis). 
 
Recently in Y v Slovenia (41107/10) 28 August, 2015 at para 106), it was held that  since 
‘direct confrontation between the defendants charged with criminal offences of sexual 
violence and their alleged victims involves a risk of further traumatisation on the latter’s 
part, in the Court’s opinion personal cross-examination by the defendant should be 
subject to a most careful assessment by the national courts, all the more so the more 
intimate the questions are’. In the instant case, it was held that manner in which the 
criminal proceedings were conducted failed to afford the victim  the necessary protection 
so as to strike an appropriate balance between her rights and interests protected by Article 
8 and the defence rights protected by Article 6 of the Convention. ECHR  jurisprudence 
has been referred to in the Irish Courts. For example, Charleton J. in examining the 
exclusionary rule in People (DPP) v Cash [2007] IEHC 108  noted: ‘the entire focus is on 
the accused and his rights; the rights of the community to live safely has receded out of 
view’. He drew attention to  European Convention on Human Rights, and particularly the 
decision of X and Y v The Netherlands ((1986) 8 E.H.R.R. 235), which suggests that rules 
which hinder a fair prosecution may be incompatible with the Convention. He then 
emphasised the following principle:  
 
“Criminal trials are about the rights and obligations of the entire community; of which the 
accused and the victim are members...The cases of J.T. [discussed below] and...X. and Y. 
make it clear that the victim, being the subject of a crime, can have interests which should 
be weighed in the balance as well of those of the accused.” 
The European Commission has also identified as a strategic priority the protection of 
victims of crimes and the establishment of minimum standards. In May 2011, it put 
forward a proposal for a Directive establishing minimum standards on the rights, support 
and protection of victims of crime. It includes provisions on information rights for 
victims including those with disabilities, right of access to victim support services, right 
of victims to have their complaints acknowledged, the right of victims to be heard, the 
rights of victims in the event of a decision not to prosecute, the right to reimbursement of 
expenses, the identification of vulnerable victims (children and persons with disabilities 
are at a particular risk of harm due to their personal characteristics, and therefore are in 
need of special measures), right to avoidance of contact between victim and offender, the 
protection of vulnerable victims during criminal proceedings, and the training of 
practitioners who have contact with victims. This draft Directive has been adopted and 
Member states are given until 2015 to transpose it into law. 
  
2.5  Continuing Problems 
 
Notwithstanding the increased recognition of victims in the criminal process, it remains 
the case, however, that many of the needs of victims continue to be unmet.  A lack of 
knowledge among criminal justice agencies and actors about the needs of victims of 
crime remains a central issue. For example, a study by McGrath showed that 51% of 
members of the legal profession were unfamiliar with the provisions of the Victims 
Charter (2009). There are also many reported difficulties with the provision of 
information to victims. The European Commission suggested in 2004 that the provision 
of information was not secured by ‘simply issuing information booklets or setting up 
websites, without the authorities actively providing individual victims with information’ 
(2004: 5). The Irish Council for Civil Liberties (2008: 21) takes a similar position noting 
the ‘lack of initiation on the part of the State actors in their role as information-providers’ 
to victims of crime.  Similarly the SAVI (Sexual Abuse and Violence in Ireland) Report 
(2002) identified barriers for accessing law enforcement, medical and therapeutic 
services for those abused and their families. Lack of information from the Gardaí and 
medical personnel was the main source of dissatisfaction with the services provided. 
Specifically, the Gardaí were seen to provide inadequate explanations of procedures 
being undertaken, and medical personnel were seen as needing to provide more 
information regarding other available services and options. In relation to counselling 
services, time waiting to get an appointment was the major source of dissatisfaction.  
There also remains a problem with the under-reporting of crime. O’Connell and Whelan, 
for example, in a study in Dublin in the early 1990s noted that 19% of those surveyed did 
not report the crime (1994: 85). In a follow-up study a few years later, the figure was 
reported at 20% (Kirwan and O’Connell 2001: 10). The Quarterly National Household 
Survey in 2010, which asked 39,000 households about the experiences of crime among 
those over 18 years of age in the previous 12 months, found that 25 per cent of burglaries, 
36 per cent of violent thefts, 45 per cent of assaults and 45 per cent of acts of vandalism 
were not reported (Central Statistics Office, 2010). The SAVI Report into sexual abuse 
and violence in Ireland noted in 2002, after carrying out a study involving 3,120 
participants, that disclosure rates to the Gardaí were very low (McGee et al, 2002: 128-
132).  Regarding experiences of adult sexual assault, only 1% of men and 8% of women 
had reported their experiences to the Gardaí (6% overall). Only 8% of adults reported 
previous experiences of child sexual abuse to the Gardaí (ibid: xxxvii). 
 
Other issues that cause concern to victims include  fear of crime (Butler and Cunningham 
2010: 429-460); intimidation by the process (Kelleher et al 1999); attrition rates (Leane et 
al 2001; Hanly et al 2009; O’Mahony 2009; Leahy 2014; Bartlett and Mears 2011; 
Hamilton 2011); a lack of empathy and understanding in reporting a crime (Kilcommins 
et al 2010: 57-64); the lack of private areas in courts; difficulties with procedural rules 
and legal definitions and directions (e.g. consent in rape cases) (Bacik et al 1998; Cooper 
2008;  Leahy 2013); delays in the system (Hanly et al 2009); the lack of protection and 
security offered by the criminal justice system (Kilcommins et al 2010: 64-66), the lack 
of opportunity to participate fully in the criminal process; the lack of information on the 
progress of criminal prosecutions (Watson 2000); an over emphasis in some instances on 
adversarialism and its morphology of combat and contest (Kilcommins and Donnelly 
2014); under and over criminalisation;   overcrowded courtrooms and an inability to hear 
the proceedings (Kilcommins et al 2010: 168); low levels of awareness of the Crime 
Victims Helpline; a lack of information on claiming witness expenses (Kilcommins et al  
2010: 164-166);  and inadequate support services (Bacik et al 2007; Mulkerrins 2003; 
Deane 2007; Irish Council for Civil Liberties 2008, Cooper 2008; Spain et al 2014).  
 
The lack of recognition of vulnerable witnesses in Ireland has also been identified (Bacik 
2007, 10-11). Victims of crime with disabilities, for example, remain largely invisible, 
not least because of the difficulties they pose in relation to information gathering and fact 
finding for an adversarial justice system which for the most part refuses to engage with 
the ontological dimensions of disability (Kilcommins et al 2014).  A recent study 
undertaken on victims of crime with disabilities found that people with disabilities ‘are 
not being strategically identified as a victim group, either by victim support 
organisations, or those engaged at a central government policy level in dealing with 
victims’ issues’ (Edwards et al 2012: 100). The Irish court process also remains 
epistemically rooted in mainstream accounts of victims’ needs and concerns. Such 
victims fit more easily within an adversarial paradigm of justice that emphasises orality, 
lawyer-led questioning, observation of the demeanour of a witness, the curtailment of 
free-flowing witness narrative, confrontation and robust cross-examination (Kilcommins 
and Donnelly 2014). 
 
Conclusion 
The last few decades have clearly witnessed a shift in terms of victims’ rights in Ireland, 
as legislative and policy measures which seek to promote and support victims in the 
criminal justice system have come into operation. At the same time, the emergence of a 
network of support organisations outside the statutory criminal justice agencies is 
providing assistance to victims in many different forms. The new EU Directive will aid 
change in this area by demanding that stakeholders re-examine the nature of their 
engagements with victims of crime. Though Ireland will  continue to encounter 
difficulties in recognising the needs and concerns of victims, it is clear that over the past 
40 years it has moved significantly in the direction of creating a more communicative 
criminal process which better embraces their experiences and voices.  
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